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For hyt ys old Englysch sawe: A mayde schuld be seen, but not herd. 
—John Mirk, Festial (1380s)1
A very small, very small shirker named Jo-Jo 
Was standing, just standing, and bouncing a Yo-Yo! 
Not making a sound! Not a yip! Not a chirp! 
And the Mayor rushed inside and he grabbed the young twerp! 
—Dr. Seuss, Horton Hears a Who! (1954)2
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her 
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the 
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the 
age and maturity of the child. 
—Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)3
I too am not a bit tamed . . . I too am untranslatable; 
I sound my barbaric yawp over the roofs of the world. 
—Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself ” (1855)4
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 A Messenger traveling between worlds brings knowledge to the People. They 
resist, he suffers, a Child mediates, and Wisdom is gained. This mythic essence is 
retained where the messenger is an amiable elephant, the people consist of a gang of 
monkeys, two kangaroos, and an eagle, and the child is a young twerp, as in Dr. 
Seuss’s Horton Hears a Who!. Horton tells the story of an elephant residing in the Jungle 
of Nool who one day hears “a very faint yelp / As if some tiny person were calling for 
help.” The sound comes from “a small speck of dust floating past through the air.” 
Convinced that the speck is a minute world inhabited by real persons, the Whos, 
1. John Mirk, Festial 229–230 (Theodore Erbe ed., 1905). The maxim that children should be seen and 
not heard was old by the late fourteenth century when Caxton first published the collected sermons of 
John Mirk, Canon of Lilleshall Abbey, Shropshire. Meant to entertain while teaching orthodox 
Christianity, the Festial was the most popular and inf luential collection of English sermons throughout 
the late medieval and early Tudor periods. A Critical Edition of John Mirk’s Festial (Susan 
Powell, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010). A “child” was then an infant or a young man of gentle birth 
(“childe”). Definition of Childe, The Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/
index.php?term=child (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). A “mayde” was an unmarried man or a young woman 
(adolescent?). Definition of Children Should Be Seen Not Heard, The Phrase Finder, http://www.
phrases.org.uk/meanings/children-should-be-seen-and-not-heard.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
2. Dr. Seuss, Horton Hears a Who! (1954). 
3. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 12, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. This article, first proposed in the Polish draft treaty 
initiating the drafting process, is the first confirmation that children have expressive and participatory 
rights, not just the rights to protection and welfare with which the precedent 1959 Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 
20, 1959) had been concerned. It signified the emergence of the child as rights-bearer.
4. Walt Whitman, Song of Myself 54 (Paul Negri & Susan Rattiner eds., 2001). This line appeared in 
the first edition of 1855 and is unchanged in subsequent publications.
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Horton promises his protection. He is violently persecuted by his fellow Nools for 
“chatting with persons who’ve never existed.” Only when the Who-child Jo-Jo, “The 
Smallest of All!,” joins his voice to the clamor of the Whos do the Nools hear them. 
They joyfully embrace Horton’s message: “A person’s a person, no matter how small.”5
 Horton is a story for children, a fantasy, a fairy tale, a myth. The potency of its 
story and the power of its myth are undiluted by Seuss’s undainty slang, noodling 
pictures, and irreverent rhyme. Throughout it, Tolkien’s6 “Cauldron of Story” is 
constantly replenished with “new bits, dainty and undainty.”7 In his writing, Seuss 
brings children the gift of reading.8 In Horton, he has made a true fairy tale. As 
Tolkien explains, this does not mean a tale about fairies, but a sub-creation, a 
secondary world with its own rules and laws which give it the “inner consistency of 
reality.”9 In its resonance with old tales of messengers, origins, and the gaining of 
wisdom, Horton is myth. With its not-so-sideways moral10 about how to treat others, 
it is a text on human rights.11
 Myth requires a messenger travelling between worlds; a trickster, a magician, or 
a child, who locates for us the terrestrial world of the everyday within the realm of 
myth and mediates their resolution.12 As Peter Fitzpatrick13 explains, “‘Myth’ would 
once have provided at least ‘some god endowed with contradictory attributes’ who 
could mediate between and encompass law’s transcendent and terrestrial existences 
and render the common ground between them eloquent with sacred meaning.”14 
Like ibis-headed Thoth, recorder of the Egyptian gods and pleader for human souls 
5. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
6. J.R.R. Tolkien (1892–1973) was a university professor and author. See About Professor J.R.R. Tolkien, 
The Tolkien Society, http://www.tolkiensociety.org/tolkien/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
7. J.R.R. Tolkien, On Fairy Stories, in The Tolkien Reader 52 (1966).
8. The Book that Killed Dick and Jane: The Cat in the Hat Fifty Years On [Australian, 4/02/2007], Richard 
King (Feb. 03, 2007, 8:53 PM), richardjking.blogspot.ca/2007/02/book-that-killed-dick-and-jane.html.
9. Tolkien, supra note 7, at 15. Fairy tales are not “stories about fairies or elves, but stories about Fairy, 
that is Faërie, the realm or state in which fairies have their being.” Id. at 12. His “fairy tale” is now 
better known as fantasy.
10. Henry Jenkins, No Matter How Small: The Democratic Imagination of Dr. Seuss, in Hop on Pop: The 
Politics and Pleasures of Popular Culture 187, 189 (2002).
11. A similar reading of Seuss is offered by Jonathan Todres & Sarah Higinbotham, A Percon’s a Person: 
Children’s Rights in Childrens’s Literature, 45 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2013). “The books children 
read and have read to them are a central part of their childhood experience; and yet, just as children 
have been dismissed as rights-bearing persons, so too has children’s literature been ignored as a rights-
bearing discourse and a means of civic socialization.” Id. at 5. This article marks the beginning of a 
project intended “to connect and build upon the fields of children’s rights law, law and literature, 
children’s literature criticism, and human rights theory to forge a new multidisciplinary subfield of 
study: children’s rights and children’s literature.” Id. at 52.
12. See generally Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law 16 (1992).
13. Peter Fitzpatrick is Anniversary Professor of Law, School of Law, Birbeck, University of London. See 
Professor Peter Fitzpatrick, Birbeck Sch. of L., http://www.bbk.ac.uk/law/our-staff/ft-academic/
fitzpatrick/fitzpatrickblog (last updated Oct. 1, 2013).
14. Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 9 (quoting Claude Lévi-Strauss).
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at the judgment of the dead, his Greek counterpart Hermes, winged-foot messenger 
of the gods,15 Iris the rainbow who communicates between earth and sky,16 and 
Raven, whose trickery brings life, light, and a new way of living to the peoples of the 
Pacific Northwest,17 the divine mage Hermes Trismegistus travels to heaven and 
back with the message “The below is as the above, and the above as the below.”18 
Horton’s message is its echo: “A person’s a person, no matter how small.” Although 
Horton struggles mightily to save the Whos, it is the Who-child Jo-Jo’s YOPP! that 
“put it over!” “Finally, at last! From that speck on that clover / Their voices were 
heard!”19
 “A person’s a person” is the foundation of Horton’s undertaking to the minuscule 
Whos, the message he carries from their world to his own, and the moral of the tale. 
A metaphysician faced with the materialism of the jungle, Horton has found, or 
intuited, or heard the premise of the world’s human rights instruments, the basis of 
its declarations, constitutions, covenants, conventions, treaties, and bills of rights: a 
person’s a person, and personhood entails rights.20 That the voice of the mythic Child 
saves Who-ville from annihilation and Nool from its isolationism (and the 
commission of genocide) shows that the message refers in a literal way to the smallest 
of all persons—children.
 Childhood is a realm of myth. Its geography—the places and spaces of love and 
fear, hunger and desire, transgression and reconciliation, journeys out and ways 
home—is neither outgrown nor fully known.21 In mapping childhood’s landscapes of 
tangled forests, calm or turbulent seas, and labyrinths of streets, attics, rivers, and 
caves, stories for children fold other worlds into the everyday. They tell the meaning 
of being human and, innate in that telling, the nature of the law that sustains our 
communal species. The stories ref lect much older myths of origin that tell of the 
creation of the world, messengers, and gifts of laws governing its dwellers. Childhood 
15. See generally Stephan A. Hoeller, On the Trail of the Winged God: Hermes and Hermeticism Throughout the 
Ages, Gnosis: A Journal of Western Inner Traditions, Summer 1996, available at http://gnosis.
org/hermes.htm.
16. “Iris” is a collocation of the Greek “iris” (rainbow) and “eiris” (messenger). Iris, Theoi Greek 
Mythology, http://www.theoi.com/Pontios/Iris.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
17. See generally Ann Chowning, Raven Myths in Northwestern North America and Northeastern Asia, 1 
Arctic Anthropology 1 (1962); Dawn E. Bastian & Judy K. Mitchell, Handbook of Native 
American Mythology 40, 156 (2004).
18. Alexander Roob, Alchemy and Mysticism: The Hermetic Museum 8 (2001).
19. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
20. U.S. Const.; U.N. Charter; European Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
21. Anne McGillivray, A State of Imperfect Transformation: Law, Myth and the Feminine in Outside Over 
There, Labyrinth and Pan’s Labyrinth, in Law and Childhood Studies: 14 Current Legal Issues 
10 (Michael Freeman ed., 2012) [hereinafter McGillivray, State of Imperfect Transformation]; Governing 
Childhood 1–24 (Anne McGillivray ed., 1997); Anne McGillivray, The Long Awaited: Past Futures of 
Children’s Rights, 12 Int’l J. of Child. Rts. 209, 232 (2013) [hereinafter McGillivray, The Long 
Awaited].
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matters. Being a human child is not just about becoming independent, sexually 
mature adults, as it is for other species. Childhood is, in itself, of central importance. 
 Of twenty-seven known hominids, only we survived.22 There is no other human 
species. We survived because only we evolved an extended childhood.23 “Human 
children are the most voracious learners Earth has ever seen, and they are that way 
because their brains are still rapidly developing after birth.”24 “Neoteny, and the 
childhood it spawned, not only extended the time during which we grow up but 
ensured that we spent it developing not inside the safety of the womb but outside in the 
wide, convoluted, and unpredictable world.”25 Our long childhood lets us develop 
ourselves through our experiences and environment in ways unavailable to other 
species, leaving us “the last apes standing.”26 Whether we continue to survive as we are, 
or hope to be, depends “on the child in us, the part that loves to meander and play, go 
down blind alleys, wonder why and fancy the impossible.”27 Stories for children, as 
myth, as law, guide that meandering, show ways out of blind alleys, and enhance the 
fantasies necessary to unfold childhood into an enlightened legal subjectivity.
 Part II of this paper considers relationships between myth and fantasy and myth 
and law, the fusion of literature and law in stories for children, and Seuss’s gift of 
“selling without shouting” in his promotion of a transgressive, inventive, incipient 
subject of law. Part III deploys the lens of (critical) legal pluralism to investigate the 
normative orders found in Horton and to shed light on the problem Seuss has set: 
how to reconcile the opposing world visions of Horton, defender of the Whos, and 
the sour kangaroo, prosecutrix for the Nools. Part IV addresses the roles of Jo-Jo the 
Who-child as rights-bearer, kangaroo courts, and the centrality of the child’s right 
to be heard. Part V investigates the rights of children as set out in the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the non-severability of children’s bodies and 
children’s rights, and the role of parents and the state in protecting and guiding the 
child’s exercise of rights. Part VI offers some concluding thoughts on rights, the 
Whos and the Who-child Jo-Jo as metaphors of childhood, and the power of myth 
in the making of the subject of law.
22. Chip Walter, Why Are We the Last Apes Standing? How Childhood Let Modern Humans Conquer the Planet, 
Slate (Jan. 29, 2013), http://goo.gl/JBXyoX [hereinafter Walter, Why Are We the Last Apes Standing?]; 
see also Chip Walter, Last Ape Standing: The Seven-Million-Year Story of How and Why 
We Survived (2013).
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ii.  “aLL i hEard . . . Was thE brEEzE”28—fantasY, MYth, and LaW in stOriEs 
fOr ChiLdrEn
 Stories—as myth, as fantasy, as fairy tale—guide us through our long childhood. 
For Bruno Bettelheim,29
Myths and fairy stories both answer the eternal questions: What is the world 
really like? How can I truly be myself? The answers given by myths are 
definite, while the fairy tale is suggestive; its messages may imply solutions, 
but it never spells them out.30
Fairy tales offer the child “the chance to understand himself in this complex world.”31 
The child “must be helped to make some coherent sense out of the turmoil of his 
feelings” through “a moral education which subtly, and by implication only, conveys to 
him the advantages of moral behavior, not through abstract ethical concepts but for that 
which seems tangibly right and therefore meaningful to him.”32 While Seuss would 
agree that the moral must be subtly implied,33 Bettelheim’s Freudian approach to the 
German folk fairy tales collected by the Brothers Grimm34 is anything but subtle. 
Grimm’s tales, Bettelheim argues, perform a psychoanalytical function: “Freud’s 
prescription is that only by struggling courageously against what can seem like 
overwhelming odds can man succeed in wringing meaning out of his existence.”35 Fairy 
tales guide the child through the developmental stages and crises identified by Freud.
To the child it seems that his life is a sequence of periods of smooth living 
which are suddenly and incomprehensibly interrupted as he is projected into 
immense danger . . . in an instant everything changes, and the friendly world 
turns into a nightmare of dangers. This happens when a loving parent suddenly 
makes what seem like utterly unreasonable demands and terrifying threats.36
Ann Swinfen37 shows that modern fantasy is “frequently imbued with a profound 
moral purpose and, even when set in a different historical period or, more interestingly, 
in a complete otherworld, display[s] a concern for contemporary problems and offer[s] 
28. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
29. Bruno Bettelheim (1903–90) was a child psychologist and writer. See Bruno Bettelheim, Jewish Virtual 
Libr., http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Bettelheim.html (last visited Mar. 12, 
2014).
30. Bruno Bettelheim, The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales 
45 (1977).
31. Id. at 5. 
32. Id.
33. Jenkins, supra note 10. 
34. The tales under Bettelheim’s psychoanalysis include Hansel and Gretel, Little Red Riding Hood, Jack and 
the Beanstalk, and The Jealous Queen in Snow White and the Myth of Oedipus.
35. Bettelheim, supra note 30, at 8.
36. Id. at 145.
37. Ann Swinfen is an academic and novelist. See About Ann Swinfen, annswinfen.com, http://www.
annswinfen.com/about/ (last updated 2010).
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a critique of contemporary society.”38 A fantasy may be set in this world (as in Aesop’s 
“Talking Beast” tales),39 in the everyday world in juxtaposition with a secondary or 
otherworld (as in C.S. Lewis’s The Chronicles of Narnia),40 or solely in a secondary 
world (as in J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings cycle).41 Secondary-world or “pure” 
fantasies may be founded on “deeply felt moral and religious convictions, and 
frequently result in the presentation of metaphysical concepts as physical realities.”42
 The experience of reading works of fantasy is one of transgression, of treading on 
difficult ground in unfamiliar places where perhaps one ought not to be, and of trials, 
reconciliations, and return. In his definitive essay on the fairy tale, Tolkien writes,
Faërie contains many things besides elves and fays, and besides dwarfs, witches, 
trolls, giants or dragons: it holds the seas, the sun, the moon, the sky; and the 
earth and all the things that are in it. . . . Most good “fairy-stories” are about 
the aventures of men in the Perilous Realm or upon its shadowy marches.43
This is the realm of myth. In her analysis of works of fantasy for children, Sheila 
Egoff44 characterizes the roots of the genre as
deeper than those of any other literary genre, for they lie in the oldest 
literature of all—myth, legend, and folklore. Myths can now be seen as a dim 
vision of a reality that our ancestors saw very clearly—the true and fixed 
nature of things that made for a more orderly world.45
For Egoff, the “familiar goals” of fantasy include
the affirmation of moral and emotional truths, the opening of the inner eye 
of the imagination to look beyond reality, the understanding that things are 
not always as they seem, and the creation of imaginary worlds and their 
inhabitants who  .  .  . can have faith in the midst of disaster. Such fantasies 
keep us close to our ancestors—to a time when there was a spirit in every 
river, a demon in every cave, a life force in every tree.46
38. Ann Swinfen, In Defence of Fantasy: A Study of the Genre in English and American 
Literature Since 1945, at 2 (1984). Tolkien’s analysis of fantasy, supra note 7, is pivotal in her discussion.
39. Swinfen, supra note 38, at 2, 10. 
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 10.
43. Tolkien, supra note 7, at 9.
44. Sheila Egoff (1918–2005) was a librarian, educator, and author who was regarded as an authority on 
children’s literature. See Biography of Sheila Egoff, Cambridge Ont., http://www.cambridge.ca/cs_
pubaccess/hall_of_fame.php?aid=14 (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
45. Sheila A. Egoff, Worlds Within: Children’s Fantasy from the Middle Ages to Today 3–5 
(1988). (“Many modern fantasists have made use of the ‘matter’ of myth . . . [and] the structural patterns 
of the imagination found in the oral tradition.”). 
46. Id. at 310 (“[I]n the present, it appears as if children will have to go to the literature of the past to 
partake of the enchantment of the world.”).
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 Bettelheim, Swinfen, and Egoff defend fantasy, in part, on the basis of a moral 
purpose, moral conviction, or moral truth. None, however, defines “moral.” Given 
the matter of which they write, it is clear that “moral” means something far beyond 
the simple dichotomies of right and wrong, good and evil, obedience and 
transgression. It is why the expression or exposition of that meaning requires a story 
and not a command, maxim, fable, or parable. Philip Nel47 more cautiously observes 
that “Seuss offers preparation for the often dangerous world beyond his books, where 
f lawed individuals need to remain mindful of the rights of others and strive to make 
choices that cause the least harm and the most good.”48
 If myth guides the child through the long childhood that is crucial to our unique 
species, then myth is law in its deep and difficult sense, and stories for children are the 
legal texts of childhood. Bettelheim finds it unproblematic that the child’s world 
becomes a nightmare “when a loving parent suddenly makes what seem like utterly 
unreasonable demands and terrifying threats.”49 We now see this as unreasonable, 
perilous, and, at its extreme, unlawful. It is the realm of myth that is meant to be 
perilous, not the child’s world of the everyday. Childhood is never free of its peculiar 
terrors, but to deny rights to children is to limit their childhood by depriving them of 
respect, dignity, autonomy, and protection from violence, thus multiplying those 
terrors. Without rights, childhood may be a nightmare foreclosing what the child may 
become as an adult. If stories for children are legal texts, they are texts on human 
rights. When the stepmother and her daughters abuse and exploit Cinderella, the child 
is stung at the injustice.50 When her personhood is recognized, we live happily ever 
after. When the Who-child Jo-Jo at last sounds his barbaric YOPP!, we know that he 
is heard and all will be well. If the concept of children’s rights was foreign to most in 
Seuss’s day, it was by no means unknown.51 In Horton, Seuss draws upon the deep 
47. Philip Nel is a Professor of English at Kansas State University and a scholar of children’s literature. See 
Biography of Philip Nel, Kan. St. U., http://www.k-state.edu/media/mediaguide/bios/nelbio.html (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2014).
48. Philip Nel, “Said a Bird in the Midst of a Blitz…”: How World War II Created Dr. Seuss, 34.2 Mosaic 65, 
66 (2001). 
49. Bettelheim, supra note 30, at 145. 
50. See generally Charles Perrault, Cinderella or the Little Glass Slipper, in The Blue Fairy Book 64 (Andrew 
Lang ed., 5th ed. 1891). After reading Cinderella, the children in Hampshire, England’s rights-
respecting schools comment on Cinderella’s rights:
10-year-old Daniel answers “The stepmother and her sisters were horrible to Cinderella. 
They kept her in a cellar and made her work like a slave, which infringed Article 19—the 
right to be protected from being hurt or badly treated.” Grace, aged 11 years, adds “Her 
stepmother was very cruel and denied her right to be protected from abuse and it infringed 
Article 31 when they didn’t let her go to the ball, because children have a right to play.” 
Children may also be encouraged to write a letter to the police in the role of someone worried 
about the way in which Cinderella was being neglected and abused by her step-family.
 Katherine Covell, R. Brian Howe & Justin K. McNeil, Implementing Children’s Human Rights 
Education in Schools, in 13 Improving Schools 117, 119 (2010).
51. For an excellent overview of the history, development, theory, and critique of rights for children, see 1 
Children’s Rights (Michael D. A. Freeman ed., 2004) (introduction and the essays collected therein). 
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power of myth to portray the child as rights-bearer. The inaudible and invisible Whos 
are a metaphor for the child who is to be seen and not heard. Jo-Jo, the emblematic 
Child, carries the message home.
 In his study of Maurice Sendak’s Where the Wild Things Are, Desmond Manderson52 
asserts that “the mythological elements of children’s stories ought themselves to be 
regarded as an essential site for the emergence of particular understandings of law.”53 
Stories for children are not “a series of texts about the law” but “the fusion of law and 
literature” and “the key to the constitutive myths and narratives that begin to organize 
our relationships to law.”54 Myth, Peter Fitzpatrick writes, “sets the limits of the world, 
of what can be meant and done, and transcends these limits in its relation to the sacred,” 
the place of “ultimate origins and ultimate identity . . . the source and foundational 
force of all that is.”55 Myth makes sense of where we come from, who we are, and how 
we conduct ourselves in our relations with one another and with the natural world.
 In telling of origins, transgressions, and reconciliation, myth is law and the origin 
of the idea of law. Law is derived from myth and myth sustains it. “In nearly all 
societies, the laws are accompanied by myths explaining that they are of divine origin.”56 
The Babylonian creation epic Enuma Elish tells of the slaying of the chaos dragon 
Tiamat by the god-hero Marduk who cleaves her body to make earth and heaven, and 
fashions humanity from her bones.57 The tale turns to the founding of Babylon, the 
building of the ziggurat, and the establishment of the law. “It goes directly from the 
creation myth to the myth of the origin of law because law is naturally conservative, 
and a myth about its origin would naturally be concerned with the establishing of order 
out of an original chaos.”58 The mythic origins of Western law have a dual origin in 
classical Greek mythology and in the Bible. Themis personified divine law in Greek 
myth,59 but the origin of law as a matter of courts, mediation, and social order lies in 
the Greek myth of Orestes. Having murdered his mother in retribution for her murder 
52. Desmond Manderson is a Future Fellow and Professor of Law at Australian National University. See 
Biography of Desmond Manderson, Austl. Nat’l U., https://researchers.anu.edu.au/researchers/
manderson-dra#biography (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
53. Desmond Manderson, From Hunger to Love: Myths of the Source, Interpretation, and Constitution of Law 
in Children’s Literature, 15 Law & Literature 87, 91 (2003).
54. Id. at 93, 97–98.
55. Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 16.
56. Northrop Frye & Jay Macpherson, Biblical and Classical Myths: The Mythological 
Framework of Western Culture 162 (2004). Additionally, see id. chapters 15 (“Law: Ordering a 
Society”) and 16 (“Law and Revolution”).
57. Leonard William King, The Seven Tablets of Creation (1902) (including the full translation of 
the Enuma Elish).
58. Frye & Macpherson, supra note 56, at 162.
59. “In the Homeric poems, Themis [meaning ‘that which is put in place,’ divine law] is the personification 
of the order of things established by law, custom, and equity, whence she is described as reigning in the 
assemblies of men (Od. ii. 68, &c.), and as convening, by the command of Zeus, the assembly of the 
gods (Il. xx. 4).” Themis, Theoi Greek Mythology, http://www.theoi.com/Titan/TitanisThemis.
html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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of his father, Orestes began a feud that must be mediated in order to end the cycle of 
revenge.60 The Oresteia tells of the mythic origin of the Athenian law court, the 
Areopagus, which is the origin of the Western judicial system. The Bible, conversely, 
depicts the origin of law not in mediation but in the rebellion of the Israelites against 
their Egyptian masters.61 Only upon their escape into the desert do they become a 
nation and receive the law.62
 The founding myth of modern law is that law supersedes myth.63 This myth of 
modernity relies on another myth for its authority, that of the myth-ridden other—the 
savage, the child—that lets law confirm itself as its opposite,64 as rational, dispassionate, 
and civilized. But modern law has its own covert myths of origin and validation, less 
grand than classical and biblical myths, but more pernicious. In the patriarchal origin-
myth, law’s force is backed by the divinely willed power of the sovereign, successor to 
Adam and Abraham, whose power is that of every father.65 This justified the legal 
suppression of women and the feminine,66 the law of male primogeniture, the power of 
corporal punishment, and the paternal ownership and control of children.67 Robert 
Filmer’s68 patriarchy excluded children from even the barest protection of the law.69
60. Orestes at Delphoi, Theoi Greek Mythology, http://www.theoi.com/Gallery/T40.6.html (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2014).
61. Frye & Macpherson, supra note 56, at 162.
62. Id.
63. Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 16.
64. Id.
65. The power of the father, the power of the patriarch granted by divine will to Adam and to Abraham, is 
the locus of the power of the sovereign. See Robert Filmer, Patriarcha or The Natural Power of 
Kings 12 (1680), available at http://www.constitution.org/eng/patriarcha.htm.
66. Peter Goodrich, Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, History, Law (1995).
67. In his Second Treatise of Government (1690), John Locke refutes Filmer’s thesis quoted infra note 69. 
Paternal power rests on a different basis than state power, and while children may or may not be self-
owning, any claim to ownership rests with the mother because of the much greater labor she contributes to 
the genesis of the child. See Anne McGillivray, Children’s Rights, Paternal Power and Fiduciary Duty: From 
Roman Law to the Supreme Court of Canada, 19 Int’l J. Child. Rts. 21, 27 (2010) [hereinafter McGillivray, 
Children’s Rights].
68. Sir Robert Filmer (1588–1653) was an English political theorist. See Biography of Sir Robert Filmer, 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/207005/Sir-Robert-
Filmer (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
69. “[N]ot only Adam, but the succeeding Patriarchs had, by Right of Father-hood, Royal Authority over 
their children . . . for as Adam was Lord of his Children, so his Children under him, had a Command 
and Power over their own Children; but still with subordination to the First Parent, who is Lord-
Paramount over his Children’s Children to all generations . . . .” Filmer, supra note 65, at 12. “And this 
subjection of Children [is] the Fountain of all Regal Authority, by the Ordination of God himself.” Id. 
“[F]or as Kingly Power is by the Law of God, so it hath no inferior Law to limit it. The Father of a 
Family Governs by no other law than by his own Will, not by the Laws and Wills of his Sons or 
Servants. There is no Nation that allows Children any Action or Remedy for being unjustly Governed.” 
Id. at 78–79.
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 The origins of particular laws are often said by jurists to have been lost in 
antiquity, or the mists of time. Yet many lawyers have dipped into the Roman law 
collected and digested by Justinian in AD 535 and rediscovered in the twelfth 
century.70 Justinian observed of Roman law that “[t]he power which we have over our 
children is peculiar to Roman citizens; for there are no other men possessing such a 
power over children as we have.”71 Although paternal power was comparatively 
diminished under the common law, its incidents of custody, control, and corporal 
punishment were retained. In Freud’s origin myth, law is forged from the guilt of the 
primal horde, an ancestral band of brothers who, desiring the women hoarded by 
their despotic father, devour him, and from their horror create the foundation of 
patriarchal law.72 That children could be rights-bearers was foreclosed by these law-
myths. The foundation of the law of new nations is the myth that law is an ideal of 
balanced perfection created by that nation’s constitutional fathers and began anew 
with the proclamation of that constitution. A Darwinian metaphor was seized by 
late nineteenth-century jurists who saw law as a self-evolving, self-purifying entity to 
be discovered or recovered by jurists across time.73 If law is no longer an emanation of 
the will of the sovereign but an “entity” with the power to endlessly purify itself 
through evolving case law and legislation, then its evolution will reflect the changing 
social environment. It is perhaps not entirely coincidental that the nineteenth century 
was a period of unprecedented reform in the governance of childhood in such areas 
70. The rediscovery of Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis had a profound inf luence on the development of 
common law principles governing the family; as of course did the ecclesiastical courts that applied 
Roman law. See T. Lambert Mears, The Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, The Twelve Tables, 
and the CXVIIITH and CXXVITH Novels (1882).
71. Id. at 270.
72. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (James Strachey trans., 1950).
They revoked their deed by forbidding the killing of the totem, the substitute for their 
father; and they renounced its fruits by resigning their claim to the women who had 
now been set free. They thus created out of their filial sense of guilt the two fundamental 
taboos of totemism, which for that very reason inevitably corresponded to the two 
repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex. 
 Id. at 142.
This tumultuous mob of brothers were filled with the same contradictory feelings 
which we can see at work in the ambivalent father complexes of our children and of our 
neurotic patients. They hated their father, who presented such a formidable obstacle to 
their craving for power and their sexual desires; but they loved and admired him too.
 Id. at 143.
73. Peter Fitzpatrick writes:
[Law’s] entity is sustained despite the process of change by presenting transition as a 
step from one state containing the entity to another [from the primitive to the modern, 
and so on]. The overall transition is always one from the simple to the complex, from 
the unified to the diverse .  .  . differentiation is always accompanied by a continued 
social integration, by an encompassing order in which the part of law is heightened. 
The entity in evolving responds to and overcomes the inadequacies of its prior form.
 Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 195.
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as maternal access and custody, child labor, universal education, and protection from 
physical and sexual abuse and exploitation.74
 If modern law appears unconcerned with myths of origin, it continues to rely on 
lesser myths—the majesty of its courts, the impartiality of its judges, the righteousness 
of its edicts. Cases before the courts tell of passions and betrayals, love and fear, loss 
and despair, hardship and travail, transgressions and reconciliations, and lessons 
taught (and sometimes learned)—all the stuff of myth. Law draws upon mythic 
understandings of self and other in delineating limits that must not be transgressed, 
and in defining the punishment awaiting transgressors. It makes a special space for 
certain transgressors, for children among others. That children must grow up is the 
fundamental law of childhood. Infantia, without (legal) speech and therefore 
innocent, becomes doli capax, capable of malice and deceit.75 Innocence yields to legal 
subjectivity. If the child’s knowledge of good and evil brings expulsion from the 
garden of childhood, it is myth that brings her safely through the gates.
 Stories for children reflect law in its mythic infancy and original power. They do 
more than shape the incipient subject of law. They are law. If childhood is a journey 
toward law, and if legal subjectivity is to be understood as something more (or other) 
than enforced obedience to fixed rules, then something more (or other) is needed than 
the moral foreclosure of the didactic homily—the girl disobeys her mother; she is eaten 
by a bear—and the positivist foreclosure of law. “You can’t pour didacticism down little 
throats,”76 Seuss explains. “Oh, you might cram a little bit down. But it won’t stay down. 
The little throats know how to spit it right out again.”77 That myth may be cloaked in 
modernity and the tropes of the everyday does not diminish its transformative power. 
The mythic is structured to reflect the everyday and the everyday invokes the mythic. 
“For myth is the instant vision of a complex process,” Marshall McLuhan78 writes, the 
moment in which that process contracts or implodes.79 
 Stories featuring child protagonists hold a special power. “The child motif 
represents the preconscious, childhood aspect of the collective psyche.”80 The Child as 
74. See generally Anne McGillivray, Childhood in the Shadow of Parens Patriae, in Multiple Lenses, 
Multiple Images: Perspectives on the Child Across Time, Space and Disciplines 38 (Hillel 
Goelman, Shelia Marshall, & Sally Ross eds., 2004) [hereinafter McGillivray, Childhood in the Shadow 
of Parens Patriae]; Anne McGillivray, Children’s Rights, Paternal Power and Fiduciary Duty: From Roman 
Law to the Supreme Court of Canada, 18 Int’l J. Child. Rts. 21 (2012).
75. McGillivray, Childhood in the Shadow of Parens Patriae, supra note 74, at 42, 50.
76. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 188.
77. Id.
78. Marshall McLuhan (1911–1980) was a Canadian philosopher who focused on the way we communicate. 
See Terrence Gordon, Marshall Who?, marshallmcluhan.com, http://www.marshallmcluhan.com/
biography/ (July 2002). 
79. Lewis Lapham, Introduction to Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of 
Man 25 (MIT Press 1994) (1964). 
80. C.G. Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, in 9 The Collected Works of C.G. Jung 1, 
161 (William McGuire, et al. eds., R.C.F. Hull trans., 2d ed. 1981); see McGillivray, State of Imperfect 
Transformation, supra note 21.
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an image “unites the opposites [as] a mediator, bringer of healing, that is, one who 
makes whole.”81 This is the role of Horton’s Jo-Jo in the reconciliation of the Nools and 
the Whos. The Child at the heart of myth symbolizes “the strongest, the most 
ineluctable urge in every being, namely the urge to realize itself.”82 This self-realization 
is powerfully expressed in Jo-Jo’s triumphant YOPP! The Child of contemporary 
stories for children remains linked with the conception of childhood emergent in the 
work of Locke and Rousseau; a “pure point of origin” with access to a lost world or a 
primitive state of being which the child then restores to the adult.83 This view centers 
the adult in stories for children. But what of the child for whom the story is made?
 For Seuss, writing for children is a purposeful activity and that purpose is to 
enhance children’s participation in civil society.84 “Children’s Reading and Children’s 
Thinking are the rock bottom base upon which this country will rise. Or not rise . . . 
writers are beginning to realize that books for children have a greater potential for 
good, or evil, than any other form of literature on earth.”85 Stories for children, as 
myth, are legal texts. This returns us to the question of adult purpose. Whose story 
is it? As Jacqueline Rose86 asks, who is it who does not want Peter Pan to grow up?87 
It is probably not his child reader. Where the aim of a story is to instill principles of 
civility, we may similarly ask, whose law is it? If we are not to cram didacticism down 
little throats, and if law requires a truly participatory subject who is transgressive, 
81. Jung, supra note 80, at 164.
82. Id. at 170.
83. Jacqueline Rose, The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction 10 (U. 
Penn. Press rev. ed. 1992).
84. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 10, at 187–208; Nel, supra note 48, at 178. 
It is of paramount importance that both Horton and the smallest Who act not only 
each for himself, but also for the common good. Every individual is uniquely 
responsible. Without the personal and individual acceptance of responsibility, the very 
survival of the world is threatened. Dr. Seuss’s is thus not only a vision of individuals, 
but of community. It rests upon a faith that the exercise of individuality will build and 
strengthen social life. It will not initiate a dispersion into irreconcilable diversities but 
rather will serve as a common ground for respecting differences and making possible 
their expression and appreciation. As a social vision, it pledges itself to a community of 
unique, participating individuals, without which the individuals themselves, with their 
world, will perish.
 Shira Wolosky, Democracy in America: By Dr. Seuss, 85 Southwest Rev. 167, 178 (2000).
85. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 187.
86. Jacqueline Rose is a Professor of English at Queen Mary, University of London. See Profile of Professor 
Jacqueline Rose, Queen Mary U. of London, http://www.sed.qmul.ac.uk/staff/rosej.html (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2014).
87. The child of children’s fiction is 
the one the category itself sets in place, the one which it needs to believe is there for its 
own purposes. . . . Suppose, therefore, that Peter Pan is a little boy who does not grow 
up, not because he doesn’t want to, but because someone else prefers that he shouldn’t. 
Suppose, therefore, that what is at stake in Peter Pan is the adult’s desire for the child.
 Rose, supra note 83, at 3.
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choosing, and inventive, then a transgressive, choosing, and inventive protagonist is 
required. We find this protagonist in, among others, the nonsense tradition of 
Jonathan Swift, Edward Lear, Lewis Carroll, and Hilaire Belloc.88 Gulliver ponders 
the nature of humanity in the foul Yahoos and their noble horses,89 Lear’s limericks 
mock the Victorian morality tale,90 clever Alice solves the riddles set by Wonderland’s 
childish adults,91 and Belloc’s Jim who, having failed to “keep a hold of Nurse / For 
fear of finding something worse,” is eaten by a lion.92 We also find this protagonist in 
the nonsense of Dr. Seuss. If the story is to have the mythic power that makes it law, 
it must leave space for the reader to make her own intuitive leap to an understanding 
of law. It cannot be didactic. As Seuss explains, “when we have a moral, we try to tell 
it sideways.”93 
 Behind Horton f lickers another kind of myth. This is Rolande Barthes’s94 “myth, 
today,” produced by commercial and political words and images.95 In this ad-myth, 
“there never is any contradiction, conflict, or split between the meaning and the 
form.”96 It has “an imperative, buttonholing character: stemming from an historical 
concept, directly springing from contingency . . . it is I whom it has come to seek. It 
is turned towards me, I am subjected to its intentional force, it summons me . . . .”97 
It is “poverty-stricken. It does not know how to proliferate; being produced on order 
88. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 189.
89. See generally Johnathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels (Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1992).
90. Edward Lear (1812–88) was an English author and poet, mostly known for his literary nonsense in his 
limericks, a form he popularized. See Biography of Edward Lear, Poetry Found., http://www.
poetryfoundation.org/bio/edward-lear (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
91. See generally Lewis Carrol, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Lee & Shepard 1869).
92. Hilaire Belloc, Jim, Who Ran Away from His Nurse and Was Eaten by a Lion, in Cautionary Tales for 
Children: Designed for the Admonition of Children Between the Ages of Eight and 
Fourteen Years 9, 16 (Alfred A. Knopf 1922).
93. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 189.
94. Roland Barthes (1915–80) was a French philosopher and literary theorist. See Biography of Roland 
Barthes, Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/54319/Roland-
Barthes (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
95. Roland Barthes, Mythologies 107–09 (Annette Lavers trans., 1970).
96. Barthes writes further:
[I]f I am in a car and I look at the scenery through the window, I can at will focus on 
the scenery or on the window-pane. At one moment I grasp the presence of the glass 
and the distance of the landscape; at another, on the contrary, the transparency of the 
glass and the depth of the landscape; but the result of this alternation is constant: the 
glass is at once present and empty to me, and the landscape unreal and full. The same 
thing occurs in the mythical signifier: its form is empty but present, its meaning absent 
but full. To wonder at this contradiction I must voluntarily interrupt this turnstile of 
form and meaning, I must focus on each separately, and apply to myth a static method 
of deciphering, in short, I must go against its own dynamics: to sum up, I must pass 
from the state of reader to that of mythologist.
 Id. at 122.
97. Id. at 123.
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and for a temporally limited prospect, it is invented with difficulty. It lacks a major 
faculty, that of fabulizing.”98 Barthes’s critique may apply to Theodore Geisel’s 
advertisements in which Seussian characters first emerge.99 Whether the critique 
applies to his books for children is a matter of taste, but what is clear is that, in both 
his ad-cartoons and his children’s books, he displays “the great salesman’s gift for 
distilling an idea, making it glamorous and amusing—selling without shouting.”100 If 
what Seuss is selling is a transgressive, choosing, and inventive legal subject, then 
this is the focus of a critical legal pluralism.
iii.  “it’s aLL fULL Of pErsOns! thEY’LL prOVE it tO YOU!”101—VaLidating thE 
OthEr
 Nested within the tale of Horton is a plurality of normative orders. A normative 
order is a schema or worldview which may or may not have the authority of law, but 
carries an authority, moral or otherwise. Most obvious of the normative orders in 
Horton are the worlds of the Jungle of Nool and the dust-speck world of the Whos. 
Within these worlds exists a plurality of orders whose representatives each seek to 
validate those orders. Horton, having heard the Whos and sworn to protect them, 
must validate their order by proving their reality to his fellow Nools. The Mayor of 
Who-ville, whose office requires that he preserve the Who order, must summon every 
citizen of Who-ville to prove the existence, the reality, of that order. The sour 
kangaroo, self-appointed ruler of Nool, has dedicated herself to preserving a Noolian 
order that includes no Whos. The Who-child Jo-Jo must decide whether the cause of 
the Whos is worthy of interrupting his own normative reality, a sort of sullen solitude. 
Only when Horton of the Nools and the Mayor of the Whos join the authority of 
their respective orders does Jo-Jo respond to the needs of the larger Who order.
 The lens of legal pluralism helps to show how competing normative orders are 
navigated and mediated by their subjects. Legal pluralism is a way of thinking about 
law which recognizes the coexistence of a plurality of legal orders and a plurality of 
sites of normativity, of other forms of ordering which may or may not be characterized 
as law.102 The daily horoscope, one’s elders, one’s street gang, or Oprah may play a 
stronger role than law in shaping thought, conduct, and the form of everyday life. If 
“knowledge is a process of creating and maintaining myths about realities” and legal 
98. Id. at 148.
99. A proto-Horton is seen in a Flit ad showing a circus elephant watching a tightrope-walker. See Jim 
Edwards, These Ads Drawn by Dr Seuss Before He Was Famous Are Utterly Charming, Bus. Insider (Jan. 
30, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-ads-drawn-by-dr-suess-before-he-was-famous-are-
utterly-charming-2012-1?op=1/ links.
100. Richard Corliss, That Old Feeling: Seuss on First, Time (Mar. 2, 2004), http://www.time.com/time/arts/
article/0,8599,597240,00.html.
101. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
102. See generally Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick Macdonald, What Is a Critical Legal Pluralism?, 12 
Can. J.L. & Soc’y 25 (1997); McGillivray, State of Imperfect Transformation, supra note 21, at 10–28.
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knowledge is about “creating and maintaining self-understandings,”103 then a critical 
legal pluralism takes this a step further by situating legal order within the individual 
subject of law. The legal subject becomes a subject of a plurality of normative orders. 
In navigating between orders, she becomes a law-inventing, law-subverting genetrix 
of normativity. In this view, law is neither outside nor above its subjects. It is not a 
matter of fiat but of reciprocal construction. Law exists “within all members of any 
society that purports to recognize them as legal subjects.”104
 Horton is a picture-book. If a normative order is also a schema, then a discussion of 
the worlds in Horton must also include Seuss’s illustrations. As Louis Menand105 notes 
of The Cat in the Hat,106 a “Beginner Book” written three years and four books after 
Horton, it “stood for the idea that language skills—and many other subjects—ought to 
be taught through illustrated storybooks, rather than primers and textbooks.”107 The 
idea can be traced to Comenius, a seventeenth-century educator who understood that 
illustrations carry at least as much information as text, and that pictures teach more 
than words.108 The child sees the story in the words and the story in the pictures, each 
conveying different subtle meanings. Horton’s palette consists of a suffused blue paling 
into greyed-out baby-blues and a pink saturating into deep crimson. Outlines are black 
and bold. Maurice Sendak terms the style “a private Seussian dreamscape” of “slippery, 
sloppery, curvy, altogether delicious Art Deco palazzos” that “invite you to slide and 
bump along, in and out of flaming colored mazes . . . past grand, even apocalyptic, 
oceans and skies.”109 Elements of surrealism, Dadaism, Gaudi, Dali, art deco, M.C. 
Escher, and even Picasso can be identified. Jon Agee110 attempts a definition: “Seussism 
(\o7 Soos-izm\f7 ), n. Fine Arts. A style of art characterized chiefly by a grandubulous 
103. Kleinhans & Macdonald, supra note 102, at 35.
104. Id. at 46.
105. Louis Menand is the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University. See 
Biography of Louis Menand, Harv. U., http://english.fas.harvard.edu/faculty/menand/ (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2014). 
106. Dr. Seuss, The Cat in the Hat (1957).
107. Louis Menand, Cat People: What Dr. Seuss Really Taught Us, New Yorker (Dec. 23, 2002), http://www.
newyorker.com/archive/2002/12/23/021223crat_atlarge?currentPage=all.
108. Picture books have been used to instruct children since Comenius published his Orbis Sensualium Pictus 
in Nuremberg in 1658. “An enlightened and illustrated Latin vocabulary, with words in German, Latin, 
Italian and French,” it was translated into English by Charles Hoole in 1659 as Orbis Sensualium Pictus… 
Visible World; or A Nomenclature and Pictures of All the Chief Things that Are in the World. In 1664, Festin 
Corin published his English illustrated alphabet, The Childes First Tutor: or, The Master and Mistris—
Teaching Children an Easie and Delightful Way to Learn the Twenty Four Letters. See Historical Survey of 
Children’s Literature in the British Library, Brit. Libr., www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpsubject/literature/
chillit/childhist/childhistorical.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). Orbis Pictus was used in European and 
North American children’s education for over two centuries. Jean Piaget, Jan Amos Comenius, 23 
Prospects 173 (1993).
109. Maurice Sendak, Introduction to Audrey Geisel, The Secret Art of Dr. Seuss (Random House 
1995).
110. Jon Agee is an author of children’s books. See Biography of Jon Agee, jonagee.com, http://www.
jonagee.com/html/bio.php?nav=2&sub=0 (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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sense of ornamentation and color, where exotic, snergelly architecture twists, turns and 
schloops into countless grickelly filigrees and flourishes . . . .”111 The myth of Horton is 
enhanced by the floating timelessness of its fantastical landscapes, its gravity-defying 
architecture, and its weird dwellers, some of whom are barely subliminally identifiable 
(bugs?)112 but familiar as family.
 A second schema in Horton is its odd, compelling rhyme. Words, some freely 
invented, are arranged in rhymed anapestic dimeter,113 an arresting riffing galloping 
rap that creates a second world of sound and sense joined by rhythm. Seuss’s rhyming 
is not the sort of poetry114 that prohibits translation, whether academic or linguistic. 
As Claude Lévi-Strauss115 explains,
Poetry is a kind of speech which cannot be translated except at the cost of 
serious distortions; whereas the mythical value of the myth is preserved even 
through the worst translation. Myth is language, functioning on an especially 
high level where meaning succeeds practically at ‘taking off ’ from the linguistic 
ground on which it keeps on rolling.116
Pictures and words convey the conf licting, competing normative values of the 
characters in the story. The title page shows a quizzical elephant looking out at the 
reader, having perhaps just noticed a random house in the field behind him. This 
draws our attention to the world of publishing (Random House) and to the 
incongruity of either the house or the elephant. There is a dedication, “For My Great 
Friend, Mitsugi Nakamura of Kyoto, Japan.”117 The Japanese cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were bombed into oblivion by American forces nine years before the book 
appeared.118 But that is another world and we do not dwell there.
 We turn the page. We are transported to a pool in the Jungle of Nool in which a 
blissful elephant soaks. He is Horton, and he hears “a small noise . . . a very faint 
111. Jon Agee, The 500 Cats of Theodor Geisel: The Secret Art of Dr. Seuss, L.A. Times (Dec. 3, 1995), http://
articles.latimes.com/1995-12-03/books/bk-9687_1_secret-art.
112. A conversation between Seuss and his editor Helen Geisel confirms the uncertainty:
“Now he looks like a bug,” [stated Helen]. 
“Well, they are bugs,” said [Seuss] defensively. 
“They are not bugs,” replied Helen. “Those Whos are just small people.”
 Philip Nel, Dr. Seuss: American Icon 110 (2004).
113. See id. at 16–21.
114. Id., on whether Seuss-rhyme is ‘poetry’.
115. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009) was a French anthropologist and ethnologist. See Edward Rothstein, 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, 100, Dies; Altered Western Views on the ‘Primitive’, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2009), 
http://nyti.ms/qALOGu.
116. Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 21.
117. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2. 
118. But see Nel, supra note 48, at 77 (“While the Whos could represent children or any minority populations, 
given that the book was written upon Seuss’s return from Japan and . . . influenced by his visits to Japanese 
schools, it is reasonable to assume that Seuss was thinking of the Japanese people when he created these 
Whos [but to equate Horton with the United States] may press this parallel a bit too much.”).
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yelp / As if some tiny person were calling for help.” Another world has f loated into 
the everyday world of the jungle. Horton is a logical beast. As specks of dust “are not 
able to yell,” he concludes that “there must / Be someone on top of that small speck 
of dust! / Some sort of creature of very small size.” He makes an empathetic leap, 
envisioning “some poor little person who’s shaking with fear.” He makes a promise: 
“I’ll just have to save him.” He justifies it, first, on the argument that “Because, after 
all, / A person’s a person, no matter how small” and, later, by his own bulk: “I’ve got 
to protect them. I’m bigger than they.”119
 The sour kangaroo, the joey120 in her pouch, the simian Wickersham Brothers, 
and the black-bottomed eagle Vlad Vlad-i-koff see nothing on the dust-speck. Nor 
can Horton. He can only hear. He continues to listen to the voice on the speck 
through the noisy derision of his fellow Nools. “‘I think you’re a fool!’ laughed the 
sour kangaroo / And the young kangaroo in her pouch said, ‘Me too! / You’re the 
biggest blame fool in the Jungle of Nool!’” The jungle creatures join in the derision: 
“Through the high jungle tree tops, the news quickly spread: / ‘He talks to a dust-
speck! He’s out of his head!’” Why, we will ask, are the jungle creatures so worked 
up? What is the harm in talking to a speck of dust? We stand with Horton, who 
learns that the voice on the speck is that of the Mayor of the tiny world of Who-ville, 
“a town that is friendly and clean” where Whos push prams and lawn-mowers, shop, 
type, and play ball amid twisted, canting housing complexes joined by impossibly 
cantilevered stairways.121 Who-ville and its inhabitants are visible only to the reader. 
The reader has also seen the small fearful figure and the tiny terrified family pictured 
in Horton’s imagination. Does this mean that Who-ville, too, exists only in Horton’s 
mind? If we think so, we will have allied ourselves with the jeering Nools. What 
proof do we (and they) need?
 Seeing may be believing, but hearing is evidence. Audi alteram partem, the first 
branch of natural justice, applies even in Nool, and Horton’s hearsay is rejected. The 
Wickersham monkeys take charge, shouting, “What rot! / This elephant’s talking to 
Whos who are not! / There aren’t any Whos! And they don’t have a Mayor! / And we’re 
going to stop all this nonsense! So there!” They snatch the clover on which Horton has 
placed the dust-speck and give it to the black-bottomed eagle. Horton follows the 
eagle across stony crags begging, “Please do not harm all my little folks who / Have as 
much right to live as bigger folks do!” The blue which colored his blissful pool at the 
beginning of the tale now suffuses the pages with the darkness of night. At precisely 
6:56 a.m., the eagle drops the clover into “a great patch of clover a hundred miles 
wide! / ‘Find THAT!’ sneered the bird.” Horton tries. “And by noon, poor old Horton, 
more dead than alive, / Had picked, searched, and piled up, nine thousand and five.” 
Not until “the three millionth flower” does he find the right one.122
119. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
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 Who-ville has suffered much damage to its teapots. Horton’s suffering at the 
hands of the Nools has just begun. The sour kangaroo, now self-appointed prosecutrix 
of the law of the Jungle of Nool, convicts him of some version of breaching the peace: 
“Such carryings-on in our peaceable jungle! / We’ve had quite enough of your 
bellowing bungle!” Horton is to be roped and caged. “And as for your dust-speck . . . 
hah! That we shall boil / In a hot steaming kettle of Beezle-Nut oil!” Horton answers, 
“Oh, that you can’t do! / It’s all full of persons! / They’ll prove it to you!” The denizens 
of Who-ville cry out in 9-point type, “We are here! We are here! We are here! We 
are here!” The kangaroo hears only the breeze. She instructs her joey: “I heard no 
small voices. And you didn’t either.” The rope is carried in, the Beezle-Nut oil is 
steaming, and Horton is tied foot and tail. Despite resisting “with great vigor and 
vim,” he is horribly mauled and beaten. He begs the Whos to shout louder. It is not 
enough. “Is anyone shirking?” Horton asks. The Mayor’s search brings him to one 
small, silent Who-child who joins his voice to the clamor of the Whos. The invisible 
becomes audible. The Whos are heard. Horton delivers his closing argument: 
“They’ve proved they ARE persons, no matter how small. / And their whole world 
was saved by the Smallest of All!” The kangaroo and her joey pledge themselves to 
protecting the Whos and the gathering monkeys beam with approval.123 Wisdom is 
gained. The people are reconciled.
 Why are the jungle creatures angry? Talking to imaginary people is eccentric, 
not criminal, yet Horton is nearly lynched for it. This visceral response to difference 
is the law of the jungle. In its violence and cruelty, its retaliatory focus, its lack of a 
rule of law, the law of the jungle is the metaphorical antithesis of law. Horton is 
charged with breaching the peace by inflaming others. But he asked only a personal 
favor—“So please . . . as a favor to me, / Try not to disturb them. Just please let them 
be.”124 Only when his undertaking to the Whos is compromised by the threat to his 
own safety does he rebel. If anyone has disturbed the peace, it is the sour kangaroo. 
The jungle sees it differently. Horton’s knowledge threatens the fundamental order 
of things. New people, people who are different and (socially) invisible, claim rights 
against the collectivity. Long-held beliefs are threatened. Having laid the charge, 
established guilt, set the penalty, and hired enforcers, the kangaroo is Horton’s judge, 
jury, and executioner. Hers is a kangaroo court.125 Her priority is to keep her world 
safe for her joey. Sameness is safest. Difference is danger. If the Whos are real, the 
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The phrase first appears in the magazine stories of Philip Paxton (Samuel Adams Hammett), published 
as A Stray Yankee in Texas. “By an unanimous vote, Judge G.—the fattest and funniest of the assembly—
was elected to the bench, and the ‘Mestang’ or ‘Kangaroo Court’ regularly organized.” Philip Paxton, 
A Stray Yankee in Texas 205 (1853). The reference is to the itinerant frontier courts of the mid-
nineteenth-century American West. “These roving judges were paid on the basis of how many trials 
they conducted, and in some instances their salary depended on the fines from the defendants they 
convicted. The term kangaroo court comes from the image of these judges hopping from place to place, 
guided less by concern for justice than by the desire to wrap up as many trials as the day allowed.” 
West’s Encyclopedia of American Law 103 (2d ed. 2005).
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safe sameness of her joey’s future is threatened and, worse, she will be proven wrong, 
undermining her authority in the eyes of Nool and her joey.
 Horton as defender of the Who world, and the kangaroo as prosecutrix for the 
Nool world, represent competing normative orders. In one version of reality, the 
Whos exist. In the other, they do not. This problem is a familiar one to courts of law, 
as it is to the subject of multiple normative orders. Can these competing visions be 
reconciled? Which world, which order, is real? If both are real, is one subsidiary to 
the other? This intranormative conf lict “f lows only from its recognition and 
acknowledgment by the legal subject-self.”126 The Nools do not believe in the 
existence of the Whos, but the Whos do not doubt the existence of the Nools. The 
balance of physical power favors the Nools, but the balance of knowledge-power, of 
moral suasion, favors the Whos. Only the Nool Horton has heard the Whos. Having 
accepted their personhood he, as a Noolian subject, cannot submit to their 
extermination under Noolian law. For him, there is no conf lict, “no a priori 
distinction between normative orders because these normative orders [Whos and 
Nools] cannot exist outside the creative capacity of their subjects.”127 The creative 
capacity to accept and to rationalize conflicting normative orders is Horton’s gift as 
the messenger. He feels no need to seek “a separation, nor an eventual hierarchical 
reconciliation, of multiple legal orders” and understands that within and between 
orders or worlds, there is heterogeneity.128 Nools differ from other Nools, and Whos 
from other Whos, just as their worlds differ from each other.
 “How legal subjects recognize and react to relations within and between these 
regimes” brings tension.129 The tension lies not just in disparity of knowledge. Horton 
knows the Whos are real. The kangaroo rejects not only his evidence but also his claim 
that persons exist outside her world. The turmoil of the Nools is the fear of the other. 
That they hid the clover on which Horton placed the Whos, rather than destroy it, 
suggests that they suspect not only that the Whos exist, but also that they may be 
persons with equal claim to the respect and protection of the law. With Jo-Jo’s YOPP! 
the tension is resolved. A person is a person, however small. Other worlds, other 
normative orders, exist. With Jo-Jo’s cry comes the wisdom that no world of conscious, 
sentient beings is subsidiary to one’s own. This, the essence of the messenger’s gift in 
every myth, reflects the pluralist approach to an understanding of law.
 We see the joy of the jungle, we imagine the jubilation of the Whos, and we 
picture Horton again at peace in his blissful blue pool. What of the Who-child, the 
child who united these opposites, and who lies at the heart of myth as mediator, as 
the one who makes whole—Jo-Jo the young twerp of an order all his own?
126. Kleinhans & Macdonald, supra note 102, at 44.
127. Id. at 40.
128. Id. at 39 (“Normative heterogeneity exists both between various normative regimes which inhabit the 
same intellectual space, and within the regimes themselves.”).
129. Id.
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iV.  “pErsOns WhO’VE nEVEr EXistEd”130—thE WOrLd-saVing rights-
YEarning sEUssian ChiLd
 “Is anyone shirking?” a desperate Horton asks the Mayor of Who-ville.
Don’t give up! I believe in you all!
A person’s a person, no matter how small!
And you very small persons will not have to die
If you make yourselves heard! So come on, now, and TRY! . . .
They don’t hear a thing! Are you sure all your boys
Are doing their best? Are they ALL making noise?
Are you sure every Who down in Who-ville is working?
Quick! Look through your town! Is there anyone shirking?131
 The Mayor’s search for a shirker is mapped on a stepped, snaking, crimson path 
ending at Fairfax Apartment 12J where a tiny figure dressed in crimson stands alone, 
his back to the door, his nose in the air, and a smirk on his face. He knows what is 
going on and he does not care. He is the kind of child who, in Fifties talk, is cruising 
for a bruising. He is “[a] very small, very small shirker named Jo-Jo” and he is 
“standing, just standing, and bouncing a Yo-Yo! / Not making a sound! Not a yipp! 
Not a chirp!” The Mayor grabs “the young twerp” and, leading him up an Escher 
stairway, lectures him on red-bloodedness and the need to come to the aid of his 
country in its darkest hour. “So, open your mouth, lad! For every voice counts!”132 “I 
too am not a bit tamed—I too am untranslatable; I sound my barbaric yawp over the 
roofs of the world,” Walt Witman writes.133 Precariously balanced on the Mayor’s 
outstretched hand atop the spherical tip of the swaying lightning-rod of the town’s 
highest tower, over the roofs of the Who-world, the untamed Jo-Jo “cleared his throat 
and he shouted out ‘YOPP!’”134
 That both worlds are saved by the Smallest of All! together with the visual 
prominence given to Jo-Jo, the emphasis on his physical insignificance among the 
physically insignificant Whos, and Seuss’s views on childhood suggest that Horton is 
a fable of childhood. The plight of the Whos is a metaphor of the child’s yearning for 
the right to be heard and for autonomy, for self-determination—not as a demographic, 
a psychological subject, a consumer, an object of protection, or a future citizen—but 
as a child. “I want to see a bunch of scrappy kids talking back to us,” Seuss writes. 
“And I want to sit [there] and tell the kid ‘O.K., Bud, I think . . . you’re wrong. But if 
130. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Whitman, supra note 4.
134. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
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you’re so sure of yourself that you think the back steps need to be painted magenta—
get your gang together and paint them magenta. We’ll buy the paint.’”135
 Horton tells of the mythic journey of Horton and his people and hints at the 
journey of the child Jo-Jo toward a transgressive legal subjectivity. Because this is a 
story, we suspect that the journeys of the messenger and the child, who meet only at 
the story’s apotheosis, must on some level be parallel. We know what the messenger 
suffered at the hands of his people. What did Jo-Jo suffer? Why is he alone, and why 
is he alone among the Whos in his refusal to participate in their world-saving cry? 
He is the only named Who, his voice is heard across worlds, he saves his people from 
extermination, and Nool from its racist insularity and the atrocity of genocide. He is 
a shirker according to Horton, and a young twerp according to the Mayor. He does 
not seem to be a particularly cute or lovable child. Even in his moment of triumph, 
he does not seem happy. “Children are thwarted people,” Seuss observed. “Their idea 
of tragedy is when some one says you can’t do that.”136 Jo-Jo’s YOPP! is affirmation 
that he can. His accomplishment requires the mythic authority of the messenger and 
the civic authority of the Mayor but the decision and the power are his own. The 
story turns on hearing the child.
 Henry Jenkins137 describes the Seussian child as “born in an edenic state, outside 
of adult corruption, yet already possessing, as a birthright, the virtues of a democratic 
citizen—a sense of fairness and justice, a hunger to belong and participate within the 
community.”138 Protecting children from corrupting, undemocratic adults and 
authoritarian institutions is the challenge Seuss set for himself.139 Children, he 
believed, must “respect and trust their own internal responses to an unjust world.”140 
His fables intentionally subvert authority. The Seussian child, then, is a rights-instinct, 
rights-bearing child who is acutely conscious of injustice and unfairness. This child is 
a person in law deserving of dignity, equality, and respect. The idea that children are 
135. Nel, supra note 112, at 93. In a 2004 NBC Today Show interview, Audrey Geisel said of Seuss, “He was 
afraid of children to a degree” and was unnerved by their unpredictability. “What might they do next? 
What might they ask next? . . . No, he couldn’t just sit down on the f loor and play with children. It was 
none of that. He just had to do what he had to do, and they loved him. And he loved them for loving 
what he did.” Associated Press, Seussentenial: 100 years of Dr. Seuss, Today (Feb. 26, 2004), http://www.
today.com/id/4362025/site/todayshow/ns/today-entertainment/t/seussentenial-years-dr-seuss/#.
USp60lfLVmd.
136. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 196.
137. Henry Jenkins is Provost’s Professor of Communication, Journalism, Cinematic Arts and Education at 
the University of Southern California Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism. See 
Biography of Henry Jenkins, USC, http://annenberg.usc.edu/Faculty/Communication%2520and%2520
Journalism/JenkinsH.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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born with a moral instinct,141 and very possibly a legal or rulemaking one,142 is 
supported by contemporary research. Children are thwarted in the exercise of their 
rights and it causes them great pain. This underlies Seuss’s 1953 musical film The 
5000 Fingers of Dr. T.143
 Released the year before Horton was published, the film tells of a megalomaniac 
pianist who enslaves five hundred children to perform his musical masterpiece.144 
The child Bart, anagram of brat and brother in spirit to Jo-Jo the twerp, calls for a 
children’s revolution.145 “People should always believe in kids,” says the film’s music-
loving plumber August Zabladowski.146 “They should even believe their lies.”147 Bart’s 
poignant solo captures the essence of children’s yearning for rights and challenges 
the supposed ‘right’ of adults to physically punish and emotionally abuse and exploit 
them:148
Now just because we’re kids, Because we’re sort of small,
Because we’re closer to the ground And you are bigger pound by pound,
You have no right, You have no right To push and shove us little kids around.
Now just because your throat Has got a deeper voice 
And lots of wind to blow it out
At little kids who don’t dare shout, You have no right, You have no right
To boss and beat us little kids about.
Just because you’ve whiskers on your face to shave, You treat us like a slave . . . . 
You know that isn’t fair . . . .
I’d hate to grow, Like some I know, 
Who push and shove us little kids around.149
141. See The Nature of Things: Babies: Born To Be Good? (CBC television broadcast Jul. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/player/Shows/Shows/The+Nature+of+Things/ID/2296544019/ (“Psychologists 
have made breakthroughs in our understanding of what babies might be thinking, and what they could 
possibly know about justice, helping, honesty, fairness. Even before they learn to talk.”); see also Roxanne 
Khamsi, Babies Can Spot the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, New Scientist (Nov. 22, 2007, 10:44 AM), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn12948-babies-can-spot-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly.html.
apes-rolling-up-a-hill-article/.
142. See Michael D. Guttentag, Is There a Law Instinct?, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 269 (2010).
143. See The 5000 Fingers of Dr. T (Columbia Pictures 1953) (story, script, and lyrics written by Theodore 
Geisel).
144. Id.
145. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
146. Corliss, supra note 101. 
147. Id. 
148. Tommy Rettig, Because We’re Kids, on The 5000 Fingers of Dr. T (Mater Classics Records 2009). The 
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 If grown-ups “have no right to boss and beat us little kids about” and “push and 
shove the little kids around” and “treat us like a slave,” then there must be a right of 
the child not to be bossed, beaten, pushed, shoved, and enslaved.150 If “little kids . . . 
don’t dare shout” because grown-ups prevent them from being heard, then there 
must be a right of the child to be heard.151 If grown-ups get away with it “ just because 
we’re sort of small” and they are “bigger by the pound,” then might makes right and 
“[y]ou know that isn’t fair.”152
 The U.S. Supreme Court in its 1967 decision In re Gault established the right of 
the child to due process of law, stating: “Under our Constitution, the condition of 
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”153 Jo-Jo’s self-imposed isolation 
suggests that he, with Horton, has felt the burning injustice of a kangaroo court. His 
peremptory treatment by the Mayor suggests that the Whos treat children much as 
we often do—bossing, beating, pushing and shoving, and silencing them in judicial 
and quasi-judicial proceedings as well as informal ones at home and school. The 
basis of due process and the basis of dignity and respect is the right to be heard. 
Gault marked a shift from a welfare protectivist approach to children to one based on 
rights.154 While the decision is directed at the legal treatment of delinquent children, 
all children may claim the rights promised to “all men” in the U.S. Constitution and 
elaborated in its Bill of Rights and do have the rights promised to “everyone” in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.155
 If promised rights are empty rights, “the very emptiness provides a vessel to be 
filled with possibility, with a plurality of autonomous yearnings.”156 It is easy for 
those like the sour kangaroo who, secure in their rights, power, and privilege, and 
willfully deaf to the rights-claims of others, to claim that rights-discourse is barren, 
or that children have no rights and no need for them. Children cannot do it alone. 
Nor can the Whos. It may take a Horton to champion their cause, but lack of power 
is no bar to the status of rights-bearer. Rights are not about an improbable John 
Wayne autonomy gained at the point of a gun or some other emblem of power, nor 
150. Corliss, supra note 100.
151. The 5000 Fingers of Dr. T, supra note 143.
152. Rettig, supra note 148.
153. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967). 
154. The decision was significant in Canadian youth justice reform. See generally Nicholas Bala & Sanjeev 
Anand, Youth Criminal Justice Law (2d ed. 2009).
155. Anne McGillivray, Why Children Do Have Equal Rights: In Reply to Laura Purdy, 2 Int’l J. Child. Rts. 
243 (1994) [hereinafter McGillvray, In Reply to Laura Purdy].
156. Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: The Diary of a Law Professor 16 (1991).
In the law, rights are islands of empowerment. To be unrighted is to be dis-empowered, 
and the line between rights and no-rights is most often the line between dominators and 
oppressed. Rights contain images of power and manipulating those images, either visually 
or linguistically, is central in the making and maintenance of rights. In principle, 
therefore, the more dizzyingly diverse the images that are propagated, the more 
empowered we will be as a society.
 Id. at 233–34.
593
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
are they a libertarian license to do as one wills.157 They are nodes in web-works of 
relationships of the sort that lets autonomy flourish.158 They are markers of equality 
signifying mutual respect. Rights recognize the shared qualities, needs, and 
relationships of humans. Rights in their essence are about the human condition. The 
discourse is not barren, nor is it finished. Under the will or agency theory of rights, 
rights f low from power, autonomy, and rationality. Those lacking these attributes are 
excluded, making rights discourse the chosen discourse of the dispossessed. Like the 
Whos, children’s rights-invisibility derives not from some set of qualities they lack, 
but from size—“because we’re sort of small”—which is equated with power and thus 
with the status of rights-bearer. The interest theory of rights has no such exclusions, 
basing rights not on power, but on those interests which are sufficient ground to hold 
another to a duty.159 Rights are no longer a zero-sum game. In the sour kangaroo we 
see reflected the common fear that according rights to children will threaten adult 
rights, rule, and authority.160 When she at last accepts the personhood of the Whos, 
her fear is transformed into joy. No one’s rights, not even those of an officious 
demagogue of a kangaroo, are diminished by the fact that others also enjoy them.
V.  “WE arE hErE! WE arE hErE! WE arE hErE! WE arE hErE!”161—ChiLdrEn’s 
rights and ChiLdrEn’s bOdiEs
 Children’s rights were given universal expression with the signing of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) by the U.N. General Assembly on 
November 20, 1989. More states took part in its signing, it was proclaimed in force 
more quickly, and it was ratified by more states than any U.N. human rights treaty 
before or since.162 The United States signed the CRC six years later, on February 16, 
1995.163 Its failure to ratify the CRC, though, joins it with only South Sudan and 
157. McGillivray, In Reply to Laura Purdy, supra note 155; McGillivray, Children’s Rights, supra note 67; Anne 
McGillivray, Nowhere to Stand: Correction by Force in the Supreme Court of Canada, in Children and 
the Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Nicholas Bala (Sanjeev Anand ed., 2011).
158. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 Rev. Const. Stud. 1, 7 (1993). 
159. See generally J. Raz, Legal Rights, 4 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984). “To say that a person has a right is to 
say that an interest of his is sufficient ground for holding another to be subject to a duty . . . .” Id. at 5.
160. Some fundamentalist groups oppose children’s rights as an interference with parental and religious 
authority, and specifically with their use of corporal punishment. See, e.g., The Home School Legal 
Defense Association’s Position Statement on the CRC, ParentalRights.org, http://www.parentalrights.
org/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={30FF0076-5974-4B3C-B658-BBF7931E3EF8}&DE= (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2014); Corporal Punishment: Is It a No-No?, Home Sch. Ct. Rep., Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, 
available at http://www.hslda.org/courtreport/V11N6/V11N6CA.asp?PrinterFriendly=True.
161. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
162. Cynthia Price Cohen, The Role of the United States in the Drafting of The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 20 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 185, 185 (2006). 
163. Luisa Blanchfield, Cong. Res. Serv., R40484, The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: Background and Policy Issues 1 (2012).
The George W. Bush Administration opposed the Convention, citing “serious political 
and legal concerns” with its impact on sovereignty and parental rights.  .  .  . [Noting] 
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Somalia.164 President Obama once, however, expressed interest in pursuing the 
possibility of ratification.165 The signing of the CRC took place eleven days after the 
Berlin Wall fell. With it fell the communist threat which had been, as Jeremy Gunn166 
observes, “a core theme of American political life for more than forty years.”167 The 
CRC took its place as “fodder in the American ‘culture wars’” waged by the religious 
right whose opposition continues to block U.S. ratification.168 “Ironically,” Gunn 
notes, the U.S. State Department under the Reagan and George H.W. Bush 
administrations “played an active and extremely influential role in shaping the text of 
the document.”169
 Of the three treaties f lowing directly from the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,170 the CRC is the most detailed expression of the rights set out in 
that while CRC may be a useful tool for protecting children in countries that have 
ratified it, it was “misleading and inappropriate” to use the Convention as a “litmus 
test” for measuring the United States’ commitment to children. 
 Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
164. The United States, Somalia and South Sudan are the only states which have not ratified the CRC. The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: (Almost) the Entire World Endorses Child Rights, UNICEF USA, 
http://www.unicefusa.org/campaigns/public-policy-advocacy/the-convention-on-the-rights.html (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2014). On becoming a U.N. member state in 2011, Somalia has signaled strong support 
for ratification, and had its first formal parliament in over twenty years sworn in August 20, 2012. 
Children’s Rights in Somalia, U.N. Child. Rights (Aug. 27, 2012), http://unchildrights.blogspot.
ca/2010/05/childrens-rights-in-somalia.html. The United States signed the CRC in 1995 but it has not 
been submitted to Senate where a two-thirds majority is required, hearings may be called, and a decision 
must be made on whether it is to be self-executing and thus directly enforceable in the courts, or non-
self-executing and therefore non-binding absent further legislation. Blanchfield, supra note 163, at 1. 
Canada ratified the CRC in 1991 after reviewing compatibility with federal and provincial law. See 
Current Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Treaty Collection, https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 12, 
2014). The CRC is not self-executing in Canada, nor has it been enacted as domestic law, but it plays a 
significant role in youth justice and a lesser one in judicial interpretation of fiduciary duty and children’s 
rights. See, e.g., Baker v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 860–62 (Can.). 
165. Responding to a question on whether the United States intended to ratify the CRC raised at the 2008 
Presidential Youth Debate, President Obama stated: “It is embarrassing to find ourselves [the United 
States] in the company of Somalia, a lawless land. I will review this [treaty] and other treaties and 
ensure that the United States resumes its global leadership in human rights.” See Blanchfield, supra 
note 163, at 5 n.19.
166. Jeremy Gunn is a human rights activist and scholar and an Associate Professor in the School of 
Humanities and Social Sciences at Al Akhawayn University in Morocco. See Biography of Jeremy 
Gunn, Ctr. for the Study of L. & Religion, http://cslr.law.emory.edu/people/person/name/gunn/ 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
167. T. Jeremy Gunn, The Religious Right and the Opposition to U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, 20 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 111, 111 (2006). Professor Gunn is Director of the ACLU Program 
on Freedom of Religion and Belief and a Senior Fellow in Religion and Human Rights at Emory 
University School of Law.
168. Id. at 111–12.
169. Id. 
170. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). The 
other two treaties are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. 
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the Declaration. The Declaration Drafting Committee was chaired by Eleanor 
Roosevelt, its work in part inspired by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, in 
turn inspired by H.G. Wells’s concept of a universal declaration of rights.171 Canadian 
law professor John Humphrey, Director of the U.N. Division of Human Rights 
within the U.N. Secretariat, prepared the initial crucial draft, and much of the final 
draft, of the CRC. The non-binding 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child,172 
like the 1924 Geneva Declaration,173 speaks of doing things “to” and “for” children, 
as in helping, feeding, sheltering, reclaiming, and protecting. Seven of its ten 
principles are directed to care and protection. In using the language of rights rather 
than protection, the CRC recognizes children as rights-bearers.174 Although the 
United States had no intent to ratify the CRC at the time of its drafting,175 its 
inf luence on the decade-long drafting process was such that the convention was 
called “the US child rights treaty.”176 As Cynthia Price Cohen, U.S. contributor to 
the CRC drafting committee observes, “It may be true that U.S. proposals for articles 
protecting children’s civil rights were inspired more by the desire to irritate the Soviet 
Union than from any grand philosophy regarding children’s rights.”177 It also may be 
true that civil rights are conceptually available to children and their advocates in part 
because of the influence of Seuss’s stories for children and Horton in particular. The 
Cold War continued through the decade of the CRC’s drafting. In Horton, Seuss 
twists that potent symbol of democracy and power, the American bald eagle, into the 
sinister Cold War Commie black-bottomed eagle Vlad Vlad-i-koff, “a mighty strong 
eagle, of very swift wing” who readily agrees to “get rid of this thing”—the clover on 
which rests a rights-claiming child standing on his dust-speck world.
 The quintessential right claimed by the Seussian child is the right to be heard. To 
honor the 1979 International Year of the Child, Poland proposed a binding children’s 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR], and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). The CRC, like the Declaration, sets out civil 
rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and humanitarian rights in a single document.
171. McGillivray, The Long Awaited, supra note 21, at 215.
172. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 3.
173. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, League of Nations, O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 21 at 43 (1924).
174. CRC, supra note 3, art. 12.
175. Cynthia Price Cohen, who participated in drafting the CRC, writes:
It should also be remembered that the Working Group drafted the Convention during 
the conservative Reagan administration, which had adopted a generally negative 
attitude toward this perceived Eastern Bloc treaty. In 1983, for example, the U.S. 
delegate essentially stated that the United States would never ratify the Convention but 
was participating in the drafting process primarily so that these other countries would 
have a better treaty.
 Cohen, supra note 162, at 188.
176. Id. at 190. The U.S. delegation “not only added a number of new rights to the Convention, but it also 
wielded the power through the consensus process to prevent other rights from being included.” Id. at 191.
177. Id. at 191.
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rights treaty to be ready for adoption by the United Nations in 1989.178 Poland’s second 
draft gave the child “who is capable of forming his own views the right to express his 
opinion in matters concerning his own person.”179 This single civil right signified the 
emergence of the child as rights-bearer. From the right to be heard, now Article 
12(1)180 of the CRC, flowed related rights to freedom of association,181 expression and 
information,182 and freedom of thought, conscience, and belief.183 All were initiated by 
the U.S. delegation to the drafting committee. The right to be heard is the lynchpin 
of the CRC. As in the Gault ruling, it turns welfare into rights, and saves children 
from the dark side of the best-interests principle184 where indeterminate interests of 
the child are subsumed under competing adult desires.185 Even so, if rights are to 
function as markers of relationships of equality, then they must be balanced with 
other rights and considerations. The weight given to the child’s right to be heard in all 
matters affecting the child is tempered by the child’s age and maturity. If what the 
child desires is manifestly and provably not in her best interests, then her voice will 
178. Id. at 186–87.
179. Id. at 189.
180. Article 12 provides: 
1.  States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the 
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity 
of the child.
2.  For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be 
heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either 
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent 
with the procedural rules of national law. 
 CRC, supra note 3, art. 12.
181. Id. art. 15.
182. Article 13 provides that: 
1.  The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of the child’s choice.
2.  The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only 
be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or 
reputations of others; or (b) For the protection of national security or of public order 
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.
 Id. art. 13.
183. Id. art. 14.
184. See Michael Freeman, Whither Children: Protection, Participation, Autonomy?, 22 Man. L.J. 307, 319 
(1994).
185. Respecting the child’s participatory rights “operates both to reduce the indeterminacy of the principle 
and to mitigate the potential for judges to substitute their own subjective or speculative preferences as to 
what amounts to a child’s best interests.” John Tobin, Judging the Judges: Are They Adopting the Rights 
Approach in Matters Involving Children?, 33 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 579, 592 (2009). Where the child is 
heard, the family is no longer “a site of exclusive and unfettered parental power.” Id. at 587.
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not prevail. The child’s best interests must be a primary consideration in all actions 
concerning children,186 but those interests are not the only consideration. That the 
child’s best interests are the basic concern of parents187 does not unduly limit a parent’s 
choice in where these best interests lie. Children’s rights frame the conditions of 
childhood. Driven by love and a voracious hunger to learn and to be part of things, 
children use what is at hand to make their childhoods. In a literal sense, children’s 
bodies are their rights. As the body is not separable from the brain and the intellect, 
so too are children’s rights in the CRC to be read together.
 Horton is beaten for exercising his right to be heard and Jo-Jo refuses to speak for 
reasons known only to small frustrated children. Without the rights to speak, participate, 
and be informed, children cannot talk about the abuse of their rights. Conversely, abuse 
has a destructive impact on children’s ability to speak, participate, and learn. Hitting 
children heightens their aggression in the present and their violence in future relationships 
of intimacy, lowers their intelligence and school performance,188 and is strongly associated 
with depression and substance abuse.189 The same is true when children are verbally and 
sexually abused, or denied love altogether.190 All of these actions distort what children 
can make of their childhood and limit what they may become as adults.
186. CRC, supra note 3, art. 3(1).
187. Id. art. 18(1).
188. A study on corporal punishment found that
the use of corporal punishment (CP), such as slapping a child’s hand or ‘spanking,’ is 
associated with restricted development of cognitive ability. Cognitive ability was measured 
at the start of the study and 4 years later for 806 children age 2–4 and 704 children age 5–9 
in the National Longitudinal Study of Youth. The analyses controlled for 10 parenting and 
demographic variables. Children of mothers in both cohorts who used little or no CP at 
Time 1 gained cognitive ability faster than children who were not spanked. The more CP 
experienced, the more they fell behind children who were not spanked.
 Murray A. Straus & Mallie J. Paschall, Corporal Punishment by Mothers and Development of Children’s 
Cognitive Ability: A Longitudinal Study of Two Nationally Representative Age Cohorts, 18:5 J. Aggression, 
Maltreatment & Trauma 459, 459 (2009).
189. A large-scale U.S. study found that physical punishment—pushing, grabbing, shoving, slapping, 
hitting—below the maltreatment threshold is associated with increased mood and anxiety disorders, 
alcohol and drug abuse, dependence, and several personality disorders. The study controlled for 
sociodemographic variables and family history of dysfunction.
The American Academy of Pediatrics strongly opposes striking a child for any reason, 
and the Canadian Pediatric Society recommends that physicians strongly discourage 
the use of physical punishment. A more explicit position statement to be considered in 
the future might include the statement that physical punishment (i.e., spanking, 
smacking, slapping) should not be used with children of any age. . . . Policies need to be 
focused on strategies to reduce physical punishment, which points to the importance of 
positive parenting approaches.
 Tracie O. Afifi et al., Physical Punishment and Mental Disorders: Results from a Nationally Representative 
US Sample, 130 J. Pediatrics 1, 5–8 (2012).
190. The psychological maltreatment of children, also known as emotional abuse, “may be the most challenging 
and prevalent form of child abuse and neglect.” Roberta Hibbard et al., Psychological Maltreatment, 130 J. 
Pediatrics 372, 372 (2012). Psychological maltreatment may consist of acts of omission including 
“ignoring need for social interactions”, or acts of commission including spurning or terrorizing a child. 
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 Promoting the child’s best interests and protecting the child’s rights have long been 
the fiduciary duty of both the state and the parent.191 The first substantive article of the 
CRC recognizes this duty.192 References to the parental role are threaded throughout 
its provisions, with several substantive articles deferring to parents.193 The rights of 
children are entwined with the good of others. The silencing and punishment of girl 
children, for example, supports the abuse and denigration of women throughout the 
world. “The suggestion is sometimes made that prohibition of corporal punishment 
makes the lives of women, as the primary caregivers of children, more difficult.”194 It is 
now understood that “all forms of violence are linked to entrenched gender roles and 
inequalities” and “‘the violation of the rights of children is closely linked to the status 
of women.’”195 The lynchpin of rights for children, as it is for all oppressed and excluded 
groups, is the right to be heard. Where children are silenced, their bodies speak.
Vi.  “sOME sMaLL spECK Of dUst that is abLE tO YELL”196—COnCLUding 
thOUghts
 Stories for children map the psychic topography of childhood. The mapping of its 
complex neurology is just beginning. We know now how deeply blows, humiliation, 
and exploitation affect delicate transitions in the development of the brain and body. 
The abuse “may be verbal or nonverbal, active or passive, and with or without intent to harm.” Id. The 
impact on children is profound. These acts “negatively affect the child’s cognitive, social, emotional, and/
or physical development [and are] linked with disorders of attachment, developmental and educational 
problems, socialization problems, disruptive behavior, and later psychopathology.” Id.
  The sexual abuse of children causes similar damage. Sexual abuse studies consistently show “post-
traumatic symptoms; depression; substance abuse; helplessness, negative attributions, aggressive behaviours 
and conduct problems; eating disorders; and anxiety. More recently child sexual abuse has also been linked to 
psychotic disorders including schizophrenia and delusional disorder.” Judy Cashmore & Rita Shackel, 
Child Family Cmty. Austl., The Long-Term Effects Of Child Sexual Abuse 7–8 (2013) (citations 
omitted), available at http://www.aifs.gov.au/cfca/pubs/papers/a143161/cfca11.pdf. Recently conducted 
studies of identical twins who were raised apart show that sexual abuse is linked with “a range of psychiatric 
disorders” including dependence on drugs, alcohol and nicotine, bulimia nervosa, severe depression, panic 
disorder, attempted suicide, conduct disorder, “social anxiety, rape as an adult, and divorce.” Id.
191. See McGillivray, Childhood in the Shadow of Parens Patriae, supra note 74, at 38.
192. CRC, supra note 3, art. 5.
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where 
applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local 
custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in 
a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and 
guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.
 Id. 
193. See CRC, supra note 3; Cohen, supra note 162, at 196.
194. Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, Prohibiting and 
Eliminating Corporal Punishment of Girls—A Key Element in the Global Challenge to 
All Violence Against Women and Girls (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.endcorporalpunishment.
org/pages/pdfs/briefings/Corporal%20punishment%20of%20girls.pdf.
195. Id. (quoting Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Independent Expert for the U.N. Study on Violence Against Children).
196. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
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To define rights is to journey deep into the body, into its development, needs, and 
multiple relationships with the family, the community, the social, and the natural. 
Children’s rights are, profoundly, about their bodies, suggesting that rights for children 
are neither utopian nor extraneous but, instead, deeply practical. The confusion of 
liberty with rights has done much damage to the recognition of children’s rights. 
Visions of permissive parents raising little monsters who rule the roost and wind up in 
jail continue to plague the discourse. Seuss’s little monsters—Jo-Jo, Bart, and their 
literary kin—are more likely to wind up as responsible citizens in a democratic society 
which equally values individuality and communality. Seuss may shoulder less blame 
than Dr. Spock197 for the civil rights movement of the 1960s but their views on 
childhood resonate strongly.198 Seuss taught children to trust themselves and resist 
authoritarian adults.199 “Maybe my book helped a generation not to be intimidated by 
adulthood,” Spock wrote.200 “When I was young, I was always made to assume that I 
was wrong. Now young people think they might be right and stand up to authority.”201
 The Whos offer seemingly endless possibilities for rights metaphors, a “your face 
here” for any cause pitting small against big. (But Horton sets a blastocyst on a very 
soft clover?202) Horton has been treated as a parable on democracy,203 civil rights,204 
and the American Occupation of Japan.205 While a rich metaphor works on more 
197. Dr. Benjamin Spock is best known for publishing the inf luential book, Baby and Child Care, in 1946. 
For a modern version, see Benjamin Spock & Robert Needlman, Dr. Spock’s Baby and Child 
Care (9th ed. 2012). 
198. Dr. Spock’s child-rearing advice was widely blamed for the civil rights, anti-war, and nuclear 
disarmament movements of the 1960s. See Eric Pace, Benjamin Spock, World’s Pediatrician, Dies at 94, 
N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0502.html.
199. See Jenkins, supra note 10, at 198.
200. Pace, supra note 198.
201. Id. 
202. Anti-abortion groups have printed, “A person’s a person no matter how small” on t-shirts, websites, picket 
signs, posters, and pamphlets. Seuss once threatened to sue an anti-abortion group for its misappropriation 
of the line. In 2001, Seuss’s widow Audrey Geisel “criticized Action Life Ottawa . . . for using the phrase 
with a picture of an 8-week old fetus on a pro-life poster” and a lawyer for the Seuss Foundation demanded 
that the group not use the line, as “this is not an area in which Dr. Seuss participates.” Elizabeth O’Brien, 
New Film: Doctor Seuss’s “Horton Hears a Who” to Raise Pro-Life Questions, LifeSiteNews.com (Aug. 10, 
2007, 11:15 AM), http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive//ldn/2007/aug/07081002.
203. Philip Nel remarked:
[Y]ou can read Horton Hears a Who in many ways, but one of the ways of reading Horton 
Hears a Who is a parable about democracy—that everyone needs to get involved for 
democracy to work. It’s not until all the Whos on this tiny little dust speck speak up 
that they are heard and they are saved . . . when every last one does, they are heard.
 Dr. Seuss: Icon and Iconoclast... (ABC Radio interview with Philip Nel, Apr. 30, 2004) (transcript available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/booktalk/dr-seuss-icon-and-iconoclast/3627444#transcript); 
see also Jenkins, supra note 10.
204. See Nel, supra note 112, at 73.
205. Id. Seuss met Kyoto educator Mitsugi Nakamura, to whom Horton is dedicated, during his 1954 trip to 
Japan to study the impact of the American Occupation on children’s upbringing and education. Two 
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than one level, none of these interpretations addresses the fact that Jo-Jo is a child 
and that hearing the child saves two worlds. The reader identifies with an Indian 
elephant living with Australian kangaroos in an African jungle but that is not her 
everyday world. Her world is Who-ville, a familiar place of houses with ceilings and 
floors, churches and grocery stores, ball games, teapots, potted plants, typewriters, 
baby buggies, orchestral instruments, and Yo-Yos, all made delightfully miniature 
and visible only to her. It is as if some gargantuan Horton of the mega-planet Nool 
saves the tiny planet Earth or, given Who-ville’s sociospecificity, the modern West. 
The triumphant shout of the tiny child Jo-Jo confirms her identification with the 
Whos, joins her to Horton in his transgression against the Noolian legal order, and 
binds her to his message of personhood and rights. It is a message at the constitutional 
heart of every human rights instrument and contained within the messenger myths 
of cultures throughout the world.
 As critical legal pluralism suggests, the law requires a transgressive, inventive, 
mediating subject who understands that law is not fixed and certain, sees its travails 
and weaknesses, and strives to make good the rights-promises of constitutions and 
conventions by challenging their tenets, interpretation, and application. The sour 
kangaroo’s child with no thought of her own stands in stark contrast to the Seussian 
child, the anti-authoritarian Jo-Jos and Barts who save children from annihilation 
and free them from servitude. The Seussian child has gone Where the Wild Things Are 
with Maurice Sendak’s Max to tame childhood’s monsters and Outside Over There 
with Ida to brave its child-stealing goblins. Epithets—shirker and twerp—frame 
Jo-Jo’s transgressions as they frame those of Max the wild thing and poor, mad, 
foolish, backwards, sly, and terrible Ida.206 These epithets reflect adult perceptions of 
children as incomplete adults, as weak, lacking, and dangerous.207 The stories 
themselves tell an altogether different tale, a tale informed by myth in which the 
child protagonist, invested with the knowledge and power of myth, bestows these 
powers on the child reader. The mythic element in stories for children does far more 
than prepare children as future legal subjects. It forms the stuff from which children 
construct their childhoods. It helps children make themselves. For this reason, as 
Seuss observes, stories for children “have a greater potential for good, or evil, than 
any other form of literature on earth.”208
Seuss titles had been translated into Japanese. Horton was intended to train children “in the relationship 
between individual and community” in emerging democracies. See Jenkins, supra note 10, at 188. That 
Horton’s ubiquitous looped daisy is replaced on the last page with a pink chrysanthemum may reference 
Japan or Chrysanthemum-Pearl, the imaginary daughter to whom the childless Seuss dedicated The 500 
Hats of Bartholomew Cubbins (1938). Nel, supra note 112, at 115.
206. McGillivray, State of Imperfect Transformation, supra note 21.
207. See McGillivray, The Long Awaited, supra note 21.
208. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 187.
